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Top-Down Knowledge Hiding in Organizations: An Empirical Study of the 
6 
7 
Consequences of Supervisor Knowledge Hiding Among Local and Foreign 
9 
10 
Workers in the Middle East 
12 
13 
14 
15 Abstract 
16 
17 
18 This study adds to the growing research exploring the consequences of knowledge hiding in 
19 
20 organizations. Drawing from the social exchange theory and the norm of reciprocity, this paper 
21 
22 
23 examines the direct and indirect – via distrust in supervisor – relationships between supervisor 
24 
25 knowledge hiding (SKH) and supervisee organizational citizenship behavior directed at the 
26 
27 
supervisor (OCB-S) in the context of the Middle East. 
29 
30 Using a supervisor-supervisee dyadic design, two-source data were obtained from 317 
31 
32 
employees (local and foreign) of 41 Saudi firms. The findings suggest that supervisees’ distrust in 
34 
35 their supervisors mediates the significant and negative relationship between SKH and supervisees’ 
36 
37 
OCB-S. Furthermore, the significant and positive relationship between SKH and distrust in 
38 
39 
40 supervisor is more pronounced for foreign workers than for local workers. This study provides 
41 
42 empirical support and a better understanding of the existence and consequences of SKH for local 
43 
44 
foreign workers and also discusses the theoretical and practical implications of the findings. 
46 
47 
48 
49 
Keywords: Knowledge hiding; distrust in supervisor; organizational citizenship behavior directed 
51 
52 at the supervisor; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
6 
7 
The success of an organization in achieving and maintaining its competitiveness is often attributed 
9 
10 to the effectiveness of its knowledge management system which mostly relies on its employees’ 
11 
12 motivation to exhibit knowledge sharing behavior (Bavik, Tang, Shao, & Lam, 2017; Gagné, 2009; 
13 
14 
15 Riege, 2005). While ample research has highlighted the potential benefits of knowledge sharing 
16 
17 for organizational growth and financial performance (Andreeva & Kianto, 2012; Mesmer-Magnus 
18 
19 
& DeChurch, 2009), annual losses amounting to $31.5 billion in Fortune 500 companies have been 
21 
22 attributed to knowledge hiding (Babcock, 2004), which is defined as “an intentional attempt by an 
23 
24 
individual to withhold or conceal knowledge that has been requested by another person” (Connelly 
26 
27 et al. 2012; p. 65). Knowledge hiding, particularly in its evasive-hiding form and playing-dumb 
28 
29 form, which are based on deception – is antisocial and unethical employee behavior that threatens 
30 
31 
32 the employee’s moral norms – sharing knowledge with coworkers and helping the organization 
33 
34 maintain its competitiveness (Bavik et al., 2017; Lin, 2007). Although knowledge hiding has been 
35 
36 
shown to impose a significant financial burden upon organizations (Babcock, 2004), far less is 
38 
39 known about the cost it inflicts upon employee prosocial and ethical behaviors (Connelly & Zweig, 
40 
41 
2015; Connelly, Zweig, Webster, & Trougakos, 2012). Thus, we aim to examine the consequences 
43 
44 of supervisor knowledge hiding (SKH) for supervisees’ prosocial behavior, i.e., organizational 
45 
46 
citizenship behavior directed at the supervisor (OCB-S) (Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 
47 
48 
49 2000). In doing so, we seek to extend the scarce literature on knowledge hiding in a number of 
50 
51 important ways as explained below. 
52 
53 
54 First, while only a handful of empirical studies (i.e., Černe, Hernaus, Dysvik, & Škerlavaj, 
55 
56 2017; Černe, Nerstad, Dysvik, & Škerlavaj, 2014; Connelly & Zweig, 2015; Peng, Wang, & Chen, 
57 
58 
2018; Serenko & Bontis, 2016; Škerlavaj, Connelly, Cerne, & Dysvik, 2018) examine the 
60 
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consequences of knowledge hiding at the horizontal level, i.e., between two coworkers, the 
6 
7 consequences  of this  unethical  behavior at  the  vertical  level,  i.e., between a supervisor  and a 
8 
9 
supervisee, are yet to be explored (Connelly & Zweig, 2015). Given the prior research suggests 
11 
12 that unethical leadership or supervisory behaviors, i.e., abusive supervision (Mackey, Frieder, 
13 
14 Brees, & Martinko, 2017) and self-serving leadership (Peng et al., 2018), have severe implications 
15 
16 
17 for the follower or supervisee work attitudes and behaviors, it is probable that the consequences of 
18 
19 SKH is more devastating for the workplace outcomes than the consequences of coworker 
20 
21 
knowledge hiding. Thus, by focusing on SKH, this study contributes to both knowledge hiding 
23 
24 and unethical leadership/supervisory behavior literatures. 
25 
26 
Second, the handful of recent studies that examined the behavioral consequences of 
28 
29 coworker knowledge hiding mostly focused on ‘reciprocal knowledge hiding’ as one of the most 
30 
31 
likely reactions of the victim of knowledge hiding against the culprit of knowledge hiding (Černe 
32 
33 
34 et al., 2017; Černe et al., 2014; Connelly & Zweig, 2015; Serenko & Bontis, 2016). Drawing from 
35 
36 the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) and the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), it is 
37 
38 
suggested that negative reciprocity “involves the tendency to return negative treatment for negative 
40 
41 treatment” (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; p. 878), and motivates the victim of knowledge hiding 
42 
43 
to respond to the perpetrator by engaging in reciprocal knowledge hiding from the perpetrator. 
45 
46 However, considering the control that supervisors have on pay and perks for supervisees, it is more 
47 
48 
likely that supervisees balance their negative social exchange with the supervisor through reducing 
50 
51 extra-role behaviors, i.e., OCB-S, rather than reciprocal knowledge hiding, which may cause them 
52 
53 further resources depletion. Thus, extending the literature, we examine the effect of SKH on 
54 
55 
56 supervisees’ OCB-S which, though extra-role, is crucial for supervisors’ managerial effectiveness 
57 
58 
59 
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(Masterson et al., 2000; Meyer, Ohana, & Stinglhamber, 2017; Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & 
6 
7 Blume, 2009). 
8 
9 
Third, understanding of the relationship between SKH and supervisees’ OCB-S would not 
11 
12 be complete without explaining whether this is a direct or an indirect relationship; and in case of 
13 
14 an indirect relationship, what is the underlying mechanism? To fully explain this relationship, we 
15 
16 
17 invoke the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) and the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960) to 
18 
19 explore the role of ‘distrust’ as the underlying motivational mechanism through which the effect 
20 
21 
of SKH is transferred to supervisees’ OCB-S. Specifically, we suggest that SKH first results in 
23 
24 supervisees’ distrust in their supervisor – confident expectations regarding the supervisor’s 
25 
26 
harmful conduct (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998) – which, in turn, motivates the supervisees 
28 
29 to reduce their OCB-S to balance the negative exchange with the supervisor. By exploring this 
30 
31 
mediation-based indirect relationship, we contribute to the knowledge-hiding literature, which has 
32 
33 
34 mostly examined the direct relationships between knowledge hiding and negative work attitudes 
35 
36 and behaviors. 
37 
38 
Fourth, we conducted this study in the relatively unexplored work setting of the Kingdom 
40 
41 of Saudi Arabia (KSA)- the world’s largest oil producer and the wealthiest of the Middle Eastern 
42 
43 
countries (Nurunnabi, 2017). Due to its economic dependence on oil export, the KSA has attracted 
45 
46 a massive number of foreign workers1 – who make up approximately one-third of its total 
47 
48 
workforce. This, in turn, has made employee work relationships in Saudi organizations very 
50 
51 complicated and somewhat discriminatory. For instance, prior research on employee relationships 
52 
53 
54 
55    
56 1  We define ‘foreign’ workers as those employees who do not have permanent residential status in the KSA (i.e., the 
57 host country) and whose work visas are sponsored by Saudi firms. Thus, they are different from ‘expatriate’ workers 
58 whose overseas assignments are sponsored by their home country firms (Ang, Van Dyne, & Begley, 2003; Guzzo, 
59 Noonan, & Elron, 1994). 
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in the Saudi work context (Mellahi, 2007; Yeo & Marquardt, 2015) suggests that Saudi employees 
6 
7 are considerably more privileged than their foreign counterparts who have significantly fewer 
8 
9 
incentives  (both  monetary  and  nonmonetary),  lesser  job  autonomy  and  job  security,  lower 
11 
12 bargaining power, and fewer rights to raise their voice against any supervisory abuse, particularly 
13 
14 when their supervisor is Saudi (Mellahi, 2007). Considering this, we conducted a multigroup 
15 
16 
17 analysis (MGA) of Saudis versus foreign workers to examine whether our hypothesized model 
18 
19 differs significantly for the two groups. 
20 
21 
In summary, our study answers three questions: What is the relationship between SKH and 
23 
24 supervisee OCB-S? (2) How does this relationship work? And (3) for which employees (i.e., local 
25 
26 
versus foreign) does this relationship matter more? 
28 
29 The paper proceeds as follows. The following section addresses the theoretical foundation 
30 
31 
of the research and develops the hypotheses. The subsequent sections are related to the 
32 
33 
34 methodology, analyses, and results. The paper concludes with discussions related to the research 
35 
36 findings, the theoretical and practical implications, the research limitations, and future research 
37 
38 
directions. 
40 
41 THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
42 
43 
44 The context of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) 
45 
46 
The KSA, which is a member of the G20 and the largest exporter of oil and gas products, is a 
47 
48 
49 leading country of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The country experienced an exponential 
50 
51 economic and financial growth during the oil boom in the 1970s, which led to the creation of 
52 
53 
54 thousands of jobs in Saudi Arabia. There was a massive demand for skilled workforce in the KSA 
55 
56 which could not be met by the Saudi workforce. Organizations in the KSA hired skilled foreign 
57 
58 
workers to meet this growing demand. This resulted in the country’s reliance on foreign workers, 
59 
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who now form one-third of the total population of the country (Edgar, Azhar, & Duncan, 2016). 
6 
7 In order to reduce the unemployment among Saudis, the Saudi government took some steps in the 
8 
9 
last two decades to replace the foreign workers with skilled and educated Saudis through the 
11 
12 Saudization program (Al-Asfour & Khan, 2014; Nurunnabi, 2017). Complementing the 
13 
14 Saudization program, a recently launched Nitaqat program required all companies to have at least 
15 
16 
17 30% of their workforce comprised of Saudi nationals (Koyame-Marsh, 2016). Failure to comply 
18 
19 with the Nitaqat program results in several punitive consequences, such as the denial of new work 
20 
21 
visas, the nonrenewal of existing visas for foreign workers, hefty fines, and a restriction of business 
23 
24 activities for the firm. Also, the Saudi government recently introduced KSA Vision-2030 (Saudi 
25 
26 
Vision 2030, 2017), which aims to move from an oil-based economy to a knowledge-based 
28 
29 economy, and strictly implement the Saudization program to replace the foreign workers with 
30 
31 
Saudis (Al-Asfour & Khan, 2014; Nurunnabi, 2017). Under the KSA Vision-2030, several 
32 
33 
34 measures have been taken to discourage organizations from recruiting foreign workers, e.g., fixing 
35 
36 their ratio in organizations, not renewing their job contracts, and imposing a progressive tax on 
37 
38 
dependents living with them in the KSA. These measures have created uncertainty among foreign 
40 
41 workers regarding their job security and have instilled a fear of being replaced by local Saudis. 
42 
43 
A large number of foreign workers from diverse sociocultural backgrounds and punitive 
45 
46 treatments for organizations failing to comply with the Saudization programs have given rise to 
47 
48 
very complicated working relationships in Saudi firms. For example, Vision-2030 encourages 
50 
51 Saudi organizations to promote knowledge sharing among their employees by establishing 
52 
53 knowledge management centers. However, it also makes employees, mainly foreign workers, 
54 
55 
56 aware of the potential role of their knowledge in securing their jobs. Furthermore, not only foreign 
57 
58 workers tend to use their knowledge as a deterrent against Saudization program, but local Saudis 
59 
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holding managerial positions are also inclined to keep their knowledge to themselves to avoid 
6 
7 being replaced by more talented Saudi subordinates (Alshanbri et al., 2015; Alshanbri, Maqsood, 
8 
9 
& Khalfan, 2016). For example, the findings of a recently conducted qualitative study by Yeo and 
11 
12 Marquardt (2015) suggest that despite establishing knowledge management centers, both Saudi 
13 
14 and foreign employees tend not only to avoid knowledge sharing but also to hide knowledge from 
15 
16 
17 others, particularly those in managerial positions. The initiatives being taken under KSA Vision- 
18 
19 2030 and the intricate working relationships within Saudi organizations make a very strong case 
20 
21 
for the exploration and comparison of the consequences of SKH for locals (i.e., Saudis) and foreign 
23 
24 employees working in the KSA. 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 Knowledge Hiding 
30 
31 
According to Davenport and Prusak (1998), knowledge is “a fluid mix of framed experience, 
32 
33 
34 values, contextual information, and expert insights that provides a framework for evaluating and 
35 
36 incorporating new experiences and information” (p. 5). Knowledge sharing plays a central role in 
37 
38 
effective knowledge management, where knowledge can be transferred among knowledge holders 
40 
41 and seekers. Substantial empirical evidence produced over the last two decades suggests that 
42 
43 
employee knowledge-sharing behavior is related to a wide range of positive work-related 
45 
46 outcomes, such as individual performance (Quigley, Tesluk, Locke, & Bartol, 2007), team 
47 
48 
creativity and innovation (Cheung, Gong, Wang, Zhou, & Shi, 2016; Dong, Bartol, Zhang, & Li, 
50 
51 2017), and organizational financial performance (Andreeva & Kianto, 2012). However, despite 
52 
53 these benefits, many employees do not engage in knowledge sharing for various reasons, such as 
54 
55 
56 a self-referenced fears of losing face, losing power, and being isolated (Fang, 2017), or an 
57 
58 apprehension of being evaluated (Bordia, Irmer, & Abusah, 2006); instead, they tend to engage in 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
consequences of knowledge hiding in organizations, such as less psychological safety; less 
thriving, creative and innovative individual and team behaviors; more voluntary turnover 
intentions; hurt relationships; and reciprocal knowledge hiding (Bogilović, Černe, & Škerlavaj, 
2017; Černe et al., 2017; Černe et al., 2014; Connelly & Zweig, 2015; Fong, Men, Luo, & Jia, 
2018; Jiang, Hu, Wang, & Jiang, 2018; Serenko & Bontis, 2016). Although these consequences 
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4 
knowledge hiding, impairing the knowledge-sharing process in organizations (Connelly et al., 
6 
7 2012). 
8 
9 
Knowledge hiding refers to “an intentional attempt by an individual to withhold or conceal 
11 
12 knowledge that has been requested by another person” (Connelly et al., 2012; p. 65). Although 
13 
14 there may be some conceptual overlap between knowledge hiding and similar constructs, e.g., 
15 
16 
17 knowledge sharing and knowledge hoarding, knowledge hiding is distinct from these similar 
18 
19 constructs in at least two ways (Connelly et al., 2012). First, knowledge hiding captures one’s 
20 
21 
intentional attempt to hide knowledge from someone who has requested it, whereas, in both 
23 
24 knowledge sharing and knowledge hoarding, it is not necessary for someone to request knowledge. 
25 
26 
Second, these similar constructs are not as broad as knowledge hiding, which is a higher-level 
28 
29 construct with three sub-dimensions, i.e., evasive hiding, playing dumb, and rationalized hiding, 
30 
31 
capturing the different ways in which knowledge hiding occurs (Connelly et al., 2012). In evasive 
32 
33 
34 hiding, the hider provides incorrect information or makes the false promise of providing complete 
35 
36 information in the future, but with no such intention. In playing dumb, the hider pretends to be 
37 
38 
ignorant of the relevant knowledge, and in rationalized hiding, the hider either presents a 
40 
41 justification of being unable to provide the knowledge or blames another party for failing to 
42 
43 
provide the requested knowledge (Connelly et al., 2012). 
45 
46 Considering these dimensions, researchers have recently begun to explore the negative 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
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are based on knowledge hiding between two coworkers, “this is not to imply that supervisors never 
6 
7 hide knowledge [from supervisee]” (Connelly et al., 2015; p. 488); rather, the consequences of 
8 
9 
such top-down knowledge hiding are still to be explored. In fact, there are multiple reasons to 
11 
12 argue that supervisors do hide knowledge from their supervisees. For example, supervisors have 
13 
14 earned the supervisory role due to their control over the specific work-related knowledge that their 
15 
16 
17 supervisees may not have. Thus, supervisors’ psychological ownership of their knowledge and 
18 
19 their fears of losing power, being taken advantage of, and being exploited by their supervisees can 
20 
21 
lead to SKH. 
23 
24 This is particularly true in the complex and uncertain job market of the KSA, which has 
25 
26 
resulted in employees being skeptical about the true intentions of others’ conduct in the 
28 
29 organization (Skok & Tahir, 2010; Yeo & Marquardt, 2015). In this ambiguous situation, 
30 
31 supervisors’ control over work-related expert knowledge, which they have acquired or developed 
32 
33 
34 by investing considerable effort over an extended period, becomes a crucial factor determining 
35 
36 their job security and career progression in the organization (Peng, 2013). Therefore, we argue for 
37 
38 
the existence of SKH in the context of the KSA and explore its effect on supervisee pro-social 
40 
41 behavior, i.e., OCB-S. 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 Supervisor Knowledge Hiding (SKH) and Supervisee Organizational Citizenship Behavior 
47 
48 
Directed Toward a Supervisor (OCB-S) 
50 
51 Organ (1988) defines OCB as a “behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized 
52 
53 by the formal reward system and that in aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the 
54 
55 
56 organization” (p. 4). Over the years, several dimensions of OCB, e.g., altruism, courtesy, and 
57 
58 conscientiousness, have emerged in the organizational behavior literature. However, Williams and 
59 
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Anderson (1991) suggested dimensions, i.e., OCB toward individuals (OCB-I) and OCB toward 
6 
7 the organization (OCB-O), have been the most popular dimensions of OCB (Arain, Sheikh, 
8 
9 
Hameed, & Asadullah, 2017; Newman, Schwarz, Cooper, & Sendjaya, 2017; Podsakoff et al., 
11 
12 2009). In further categorizing OCB, Masterson et al. (2000) introduced a third category, 
13 
14 supervisor-directed OCB (i.e., OCB-S) – supervisees’ participation in extra-role work activities to 
15 
16 
17 support their supervisor above and beyond the call of duty – and suggested it as a more relevant 
18 
19 category of OCB when measuring the effect of supervisor behavior (e.g., interactional justice) on 
20 
21 
supervisees’ prosocial behavior. Building on social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), Masterson et 
23 
24 al. (2000) suggested that supervisees’ perception of interactional justice by their supervisors has a 
25 
26 
significant positive association with supervisees’ OCB-S. 
28 
29 Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), in conjunction with the norm of reciprocity 
30 
31 
(Gouldner, 1960), has been used as a leading theoretical framework to understand the effect of 
32 
33 
34 leader/supervisor behavior on follower/supervisee attitudes and behaviors (Shore, Coyle-Shapiro, 
35 
36 Chen, & Tetrick, 2009). Following this theoretical framework, extant research on leader- 
37 
38 
follower/supervisor-supervisee relationship suggests that positive leader/supervisor behavior, e.g., 
40 
41 leader-member exchange (LMX), ethical leadership, and servant leadership, motivates 
42 
43 
followers/supervisees to reciprocate positive leader/supervisor behavior by increasing their OCBs 
45 
46 until a perceived balance of exchange is reached (Hoch, Bommer, Dulebohn, & Wu, 2016; 
47 
48 
Newman et al., 2017). On the other hand, negative leader/supervisor behavior, e.g., abusive 
50 
51 supervision, motivates followers/supervisees to negatively reciprocate leader/supervisor behavior 
52 
53 by decreasing their OCBs until a perceived balance of exchange is reached (Mackey, Ellen, 
54 
55 
56 Hochwarter, & Ferris, 2013). Prior research suggests that abusive supervision and self-serving 
57 
58 leadership (Mackey et al., 2017; Peng et al., 2018) are unethical supervisory behaviors that foster 
59 
60 
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manipulative and unethical supervisee behaviors through the supervisors’ reward-punishment and 
6 
7 role modeling capacity. 
8 
9 
In further extending this work, we argue that SKH, i.e., the supervisor either deceives 
11 
12 his/her supervisees – provides them with incorrect knowledge (evasive hiding) or acts ignorant of 
13 
14 the required knowledge (playing dumb) – or gives them a justification by blaming others for failing 
15 
16 
17 to provide the required knowledge (rationalized hiding), is an unethical supervisory behavior for 
18 
19 two reasons. First, SKH is an unethical behavior as supervisors through their role modeling 
20 
21 
capacity foster a culture of deception and compromise on professional duties in the workplace. 
23 
24 Second, in the knowledge management literature, a supervisor is suggested as a legitimate source 
25 
26 
and facilitator of knowledge (Mary MacNeil, 2004). By deceiving and deliberately not sharing the 
28 
29 knowledge expected of them, supervisors put at stake the legitimacy of social exchange in the 
30 
31 
workplace, which is primarily based on trust as not all of the duties can be put into writing. 
32 
33 
34 Consequently, SKH motivates supervisees to reduce their OCB-S
2 to balance the negative social 
35 
36 exchange with their supervisors. For example, when a supervisee perceives that his/her supervisor 
37 
38 
hides knowledge from him/her, then he/she tends to balance the negative social exchange with the 
40 
41 supervisor by reducing his/her OCB-S, e.g., not voluntarily helping the supervisor when he/she 
42 
43 
has a heavy workload and not sharing useful information with the supervisor. Thus, we 
45 
46 hypothesize the following relationship. 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52    
53 2 Prior research on the consequences of employee knowledge hiding mostly focused on ‘reciprocal knowledge hiding’ 
54 and recently focused on ‘counter productive work behavior’ (CWB), as one of the most likely reactions of the victim 
55 of knowledge hiding against the culprit of knowledge hiding (Černe et al., 2017; Černe et al., 2014; Connelly & Zweig, 
56 2015; Serenko & Bontis, 2016). However, given (1) the supervisory powers for punishing a supervisee who engages 
57 in negative work behavior, particularly toward the supervisor, and (2) the work context of the KSA, which is 
58 characterized by high uncertainty, low job security, a high-power-distance societal culture, and discrimination between 
59 locals and foreigners, it is expected that supervisees react against SKH by reducing their extra-role OCB-S rather than 
60 engaging in reciprocal knowledge hiding from and CWB toward their supervisors. 
59 
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H1. SKH is negatively associated with supervisee OCB-S 
6 
7 To fully understand the relationship between SKH and supervisee OCB-S, it is potentially 
8 
9 
significant to examine the underlying motivational mechanism maintaining the relationship. For 
11 
12 this purpose, we again take the lead from social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) and explore distrust 
13 
14 in supervisor as the mediator between SKH and supervisee OCB-S. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 The Mediation of Distrust between SKH and Supervisee OCB-S 
20 
21 
The supervisee’s distrust/trust in the supervisor refers to supervisee’s confident expectations of the 
23 
24 supervisor’s negative/positive conduct (Lewicki et al., 1998). Prior empirical studies have 
25 
26 
confirmed that trust and distrust are not two sides of the same coin; rather, they are independent 
28 
29 of each other and can coexist simultaneously (Cho, 2006; Dimoka, 2010; McKnight & Chervany, 
30 
31 
2001; McKnight, Kacmar, & Chaudhry, 2004). Following social exchange theory, the findings of 
32 
33 
34 prior empirical studies on the supervisor-supervisee relationship suggest that supervisees’ 
35 
36 perception of a positive/negative supervisory treatment engenders trust/distrust, respectively, in a 
37 
38 
supervisor (Liao & Chun, 2016; Shore et al., 2009). However, in the case of supervisees’ 
40 
41 perceptions of negative supervisory behavior (e.g., strict observational monitoring), distrust in a 
42 
43 
supervisor is a more likely reaction (Liao & Chun, 2016). 
45 
46 Given that this study focuses on SKH, we examine distrust in supervisor as the underlying 
47 
48 
mechanism through which SKH translates into reduced supervisee OCB-S. Specifically, we argue 
50 
51 that SKH induces distrust in supervisees, which in turn, motivates supervisees to balance the 
52 
53 negative social exchange with the supervisor by reducing their OCB-S. A supervisee’s perceptions 
54 
55 
56 of evasive hiding (e.g., a supervisor agreed to help but instead gave information different from 
57 
58 what was required), and playing dumb by a supervisor (e.g., a supervisor pretended that he/she did 
59 
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not have the capacity to provide the required knowledge, even though this was not true) signal to 
6 
7 the supervisee that his/her supervisor does not trust him/her. Consequently, the supervisee starts 
8 
9 
distrusting his/her supervisor and subsequently reduces his/her OCB-S. This is consistent with the 
11 
12 arguments presented by Černe et al. (2014) that an act of knowledge hiding by individual 1 from 
13 
14 individual 2 motivates individual 2 to start distrusting individual 1 and to restore the balance in the 
15 
16 
17 social exchange with individual 1. Furthermore, the qualitative findings of Yeo and Marquardt 
18 
19 (2015) highlight distrust in a supervisor as the consequence of SKH in the context of Saudi Arabia. 
20 
21 
Thus, we hypothesize the following relationships. 
23 
24 H2. SKH is positively associated with supervisee distrust in a supervisor. 
25 
26 
H3. Distrust in a supervisor is negatively associated with supervisee OCB-S. 
28 
29 H4. Distrust in a supervisor mediates the negative association between SKH and 
30 
31 
supervisee OCB-S. 
32 
33 
34 In order to fully explore the relationship between SKH and supervisee OCB-S in the 
35 
36 complex working relationships between locals (i.e., Saudis) and foreign employees in the KSA, in 
37 
38 
the next section, we probe the differences in the relationships hypothesized in H1 to H4 across the 
40 
41 subsamples of local (i.e., Saudis) and foreign employees. 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 Saudi versus Foreign Employees 
47 
48 
Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), in conjunction with the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 
50 
51 1960), suggests that foreign employees tend to enjoy less positive social exchanges at their 
52 
53 workplace – e.g., limited duration work visas with less job security and fewer financial benefits, 
54 
55 
56 limited career development and voice opportunities against supervisory abuse – than their local 
57 
58 counterparts (Al Ariss, 2014; Ang et al., 2003). For example, using a research sample from 
59 
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Singapore, Ang et al. (2003) highlighted that foreign workers have lower distributive justice 
6 
7 judgments, OCB,  and performance than local workers.  Similarly, using a  research sample from 
8 
9 
UAE, Skok and Tahir (2010) highlighted that 80% of the surveyed participants reported that Arab 
11 
12 workers were preferred over foreign workers for training purposes; 97% perceived that knowledge 
13 
14 sharing occurred through informal verbal communication, mostly between Arab colleagues; and 
15 
16 
17 93% perceived that Arab national culture discourages knowledge sharing, particularly with non- 
18 
19 Arabs. Furthermore, the findings of a recently published qualitative study by Yeo and Marquardt 
20 
21 
(2015), in which 85% of the participants were foreign workers, highlighted that Saudi employees, 
23 
24 particularly those in a supervisory role, considered foreign employees inferior to them and not 
25 
26 
worthy of knowledge sharing. 
28 
29 Given the aforementioned differences in foreign and local workers’ social exchanges with 
30 
31 
their employers or agents of the employers, i.e., supervisors (Shore et al., 2009), the way these two 
32 
33 
34 groups of employees tend to balance their positive/negative exchange relationships may also differ. 
35 
36 For example, when perceiving SKH, foreign workers may exhibit more distrust in their supervisor 
37 
38 
than their Saudi counterparts (Yeo & Marquardt, 2015). 
40 
41 Moreover, the growing emphasis on the Saudization program has created uncertainty 
42 
43 
among foreign workers about their job security. The job market for foreign workers in Saudi 
45 
46 Arabia is shrinking. Therefore, it is likely that, despite SKH and the resulting distrust in 
47 
48 
supervisors, foreign workers will not reduce their OCB-S to the extent that their supervisors take 
50 
51 notice of it and make them pay for it. This consciousness for safety and job security is evident in 
52 
53 the qualitative findings of Yeo and Marquardt (2015), such as “I often keep my mouth shut in 
54 
55 
56 meetings because there’s no point trying to say something that may work to my disadvantage. I’d 
57 
58 rather stay safe and let others sort out the politics and get their hidden agendas out” (p. 318). 
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Consistent with these findings, we suggest that foreign employees may reduce their OCB-S, 
6 
7 resulted  from  SKH  and  subsequently  increased  distrust,  to  a  lesser  extent  than  their Saudi 
8 
9 
counterparts. Taken together, we hypothesize the following relationships. 
11 
12 H5. The hypothesized relationships (i.e., H1 to H4) will differ significantly in the 
13 
14 foreign and Saudi subsamples, such that H1, H3, and H4 are weaker for foreign workers and 
15 
16 
17 H2 is stronger for foreign workers than for Saudi workers. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 METHODS 
23 
24 
25 Sample and Procedure 
26 
27 Using a convenience sampling and a supervisor-supervisee dyadic design, the data were collected, 
28 
29 
30 by distributing hard copies of two different types of research questionnaires, i.e., one for the 
31 
32 supervisor and one for his/her supervisee, from employees of 41 domestic and multinational 
33 
34 
companies. These organizations were operating in both the public and private sectors of Saudi 
36 
37 Arabia. Since we aimed to gather data from both Saudi and foreign workers, the questionnaires 
38 
39 
were prepared in both English and Arabic. The Arabic translation of the employed measures from 
41 
42 the original language (i.e., English) was carried out using both a forward (English into Arabic) and 
43 
44 
backward (Arabic into English) translation method. For this purpose, we hired the services of 
45 
46 
47 professional bilingual translators working at one of the coauthor’s university’s language and 
48 
49 translation center. The supervisors’ questionnaire consisted of measures of their supervisee’s 
50 
51 
OCB-S. The supervisees’ questionnaire consisted of the measures of SKH and distrust in their 
53 
54 supervisor. The two questionnaires were assigned similar codes for later pairing. The use of two- 
55 
56 
sourced data provides a better assessment of the constructs by ruling out the threat of common 
58 
59 method variance and self-reported biases (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). 
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We employed  undergraduate business  students  to  distribute 560  supervisor-supervisee 
6 
7 questionnaires. The data enumerators first contacted employees, who completed the  ‘supervisee’ 
8 
9 
questionnaire  and  identified  the  name  of  their  supervisors.  Following  this,  the enumerators 
11 
12 contacted the referred supervisors to fill in the ‘supervisor’ questionnaire. Once received, both 
13 
14 questionnaires were matched using similarity codes, which were then removed during the data 
15 
16 
17 entry process to ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of the respondents. It is important to 
18 
19 mention that each supervisor was required to fill in the ‘supervisee’ questionnaire for only one of 
20 
21 
his/her supervisees. This procedure was followed (1) to avoid putting an undue burden on 
23 
24 supervisors to complete questionnaires for multiple employees as it might have affected the quality 
25 
26 
of supervisors’ response, and (2) to rule out the possibility of within-group difference in OCB-S 
28 
29 ratings for multiple employees rated by the same supervisor. 
30 
31 
Of the 560 total distributed supervisor-supervisee questionnaires, 342 dyads were returned, 
32 
33 
34 i.e., the response rate was 61%. After discarding the 25 cases with mismatched dyads and missing 
35 
36 values, the remaining 317 supervisor-supervisee matching dyads were used to assess the 
37 
38 
hypothesized model. Respondents’ names were erased during the data entry process to ensure 
40 
41 anonymity. Of the 317 participating supervisors, 216 (68%) were Saudi and 101 (32%) were 
42 
43 
foreign. Whereas, of the 317 participating supervisees, 183 (58%) were Saudi and 134 (42%) were 
45 
46 foreign. 
47 
48 
Saudi Sample: Among the Saudi supervisors, 77% were male and 23% were female, the 
50 
51 average age was 38 years, and the average experience was 3 years. Among the Saudi supervisees, 
52 
53 60% were male and 40% were female; the average age was 31 years, the average experience was 
54 
55 
56 4.6 years, and the average tenure under the current supervisor was 2.8 years. 
57 
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Foreign Sample: Among the foreign supervisors, 81% were male and 19% were female, 
6 
7 the  average  age  was  38  years,  the  average  experience  was  5.85  years.  Among  the foreign 
8 
9 
supervisees, 78% were male and 22% were female, the average age was 33 years, the average 
11 
12 experience was 5.85 years, and the average tenure under the current supervisor was 3.8 years. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 Measures 
18 
19 All the questions were measured on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a great extent). 
20 
21 
22 
SKH was measured using a 12-item scale developed by Connelly et al. (2012). This scale 
24 
25 consists of four items each for evasive hiding, playing dumb, and rationalized hiding. The scale 
26 
27 opens with the following statement: “For a moment, visualize in your mind your supervisor, who 
28 
29 
30 receives a knowledge request from you: how does he/she behave?” A sample item of evasive 
31 
32 hiding is as follows: “My supervisor agrees with me but never really intends to provide me with 
33 
34 
the requested information.” A sample item of playing dumb is as follows: “My supervisor says 
36 
37 that he/she does not know, even though he/she does.” A sample item of rationalized hiding is as 
38 
39 
follows: “My supervisor explains that the information is conﬁdential and only available to 
41 
42 authorized people.” The alpha reliability values of these subscales of SKH in this study are 0.94 
43 
44 
for evasive hiding, 0.93 for playing dumb, and 0.94 for rationalized hiding. 
46 
47 
48 Distrust in supervisor was measured using a 5-item scale developed by McAllister, 
49 
50 Lewicki, and Bies (2000) and further validated by Liao and Chun (2016). A sample item is as 
51 
52 
follows: “Whenever possible, my supervisor takes advantage of me.” The alpha reliability value 
54 
55 for this scale is 0.94. 
56 
57 
OCB-S was adapted from the 7-item scale of individual-directed OCB developed by 
59 
60 Williams and Anderson (1991). The supervisor assessed his/her supervisee’s OCB-S behavior. A 
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sample item is the following: “He/she voluntarily helps me when I have a heavy workload.” The 
6 
7 alpha reliability value for this scale is 0.92. 
8 
9 
We also controlled for the effects of the participants’ organization, gender, age, experience, 
11 
12 supervisor-supervisee relationship tenure, and supervisor’s nationality (i.e., Saudi/foreign) on 
13 
14 supervisee’s OCB-S (Podsakoff et al., 2009; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). 
15 
16 
17 Table 1 presents the mean, standard deviation, and intercorrelations of SKH (i.e., evasive 
18 
19 hiding (EH), playing dumb (PD), and rationalized hiding (RH)), distrust, as well as OCB-S. 
20 
21 
--------------------------------- 
23 Insert table 1 about here 
24 --------------------------------- 
25 
26 
27 
28 Analysis and Results 
29 
30 The hypothesized research model was tested by using PLS-SEM (Hair Jr et al., 2016; Lohmöller, 
31 
32 
1989) with the statistical software SmartPLS 3 (Ringle et al., 2015). The hypothesized model was 
34 
35 tested by following a two-step data analysis approach, i.e., in the first step, we assessed the 
36 
37 
measurement model to confirm the factorial validity of the employed measures, and in the second 
39 
40 step, we assessed a structural model to test the hypothesized relationships. 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 Measurement Model 
46 
47 We assessed SKH, which has been conceptualized as a combination of evasive hiding, playing 
48 
49 
dumb, and rationalized hiding (Connelly et al., 2012), using one factor higher-order formative 
51 
52 construct, whereas the rest of the unidimensional latent constructs, i.e., distrust in supervisor and 
53 
54 
OCB-S, were assessed using first-order reflective measurement models (refer to Figure 1). The 
56 
57 adequacy of these measurement models was assessed for composite reliability, convergent 
58 
59 
validity, and discriminant validity. According to Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2010), 
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composite reliability (CR) is established when the loadings of indicators of a latent construct are 
6 
7 higher than 0.7; convergent validity is established when the average variance extracted (AVE) is 
8 
9 
greater than 0.5. Except for OCB-S (i.e., 0.68), the AVE value of all the measures was above 0.80, 
11 
12 and the CR value of all the measures was above 0.90. Thus, all the measures fulfilled the criteria 
13 
14 of composite reliability and convergent validity. 
15 
16 
17 --------------------------------- 
18 Insert figure 1 about here 
19 --------------------------------- 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 Furthermore, to establish discriminant validity, we used the heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) 
25 
26 
ratio of the correlations method, which has recently been established as a superior criterion over 
28 
29 the traditional Fornell-Larcker method for assessing discriminant validity, with a maximum 
30 
31 
threshold of 0.85 (Henseler, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2015; Rasoolimanesh, Ringle, Jaafar, & Ramayah, 
32 
33 
34 2017). The results of the HTMT85 ratio (refer to Table 2) showed that all the employed measures 
35 
36 had a value of less than 0.85; therefore, discriminant validity was also established. 
37 
38 
--------------------------------- 
40 Insert table 2 about here 
41 --------------------------------- 
42 
43 
44 
45 Hypotheses Testing 
46 
47 We tested hypotheses H1-H4 in the structural model by assessing the significance (p-value) of the 
48 
49 
structural paths between the latent variables. The results (Table 3) indicated that SKH had a 
51 
52 significant and negative (total) effect on OCB-S (path coefficient = -0.225, p < 0.001); thus, H1 
53 
54 
was supported by the results. The results also showed that SKH had a significant and positive 
56 
57 association with distrust in one’s supervisor (path coefficient = 0.512, p < 0.001), which then had 
58 
59 
a significant and negative association with OCB-S (path coefficient = -0.181, p < 0.01); thus, H2 
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4 
and H3 were also supported. H4, regarding the indirect effect of SKH on OCB-S via distrust in the 
6 
7 supervisor, was also supported by the results (path coefficient = -0.093, p < 0.01); however, it was 
8 
9 
a partial mediation, as the direct effect of SKH on OCB-S was still significant (path coefficient = 
11 
12 - 0.162, p < 0.05). 
13 
14 --------------------------------- 
15 
Insert table 3 about here 
17 --------------------------------- 
18 
19 
20 
Multigroup Analysis 
22 
23 An MGA was also performed using a two-step analytical procedure. First, we assessed the 
24 
25 invariance of the measurement models using measurement invariance of composites (MICOM) 
26 
27 
28 method (Henseler, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2016) to establish measurement invariance for the 
29 
30 measurement models of Saudi and foreign subsamples. MICOM method consists of three steps: in 
31 
32 
the first step, configural invariance is assessed; in the second step, the establishment of 
34 
35 compositional invariance is assessed; and in the third step, equal means and variance is assessed. 
36 
37 
For the first step, we used the same measurement model, as tested above, for both Saudi and foreign 
39 
40 groups using identical algorithm settings. In this way, the first step of the MICOM method 
41 
42 regarding configural invariance was established. To establish the remaining two steps of MICOM, 
43 
44 
45 we ran the permutation procedure with 5000 permutations and a 5% signiﬁcance level for both 
46 
47 groups. In step 2, we compared the original composite score correlations (c) with the composite 
48 
49 
score correlations obtained from the permutation procedure (cu). The results (Table 4) established 
51 
52 the compositional invariance between the two groups. Lastly, we assessed the equality of means 
53 
54 
and variance between the two groups. 
56 
57 The results established the full measurement invariance for rationalized hiding (RH) and 
58 
59 
OCB-S, with partial measurement invariance for evasive hiding (EH), playing dumb (PD), and 
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distrusting one’s supervisor. According to Henseler et al. (2016), when partial or full measurement 
6 
7 invariance is established, then it is proper to assess the invariance of the structural model to 
8 
9 
examine whether the groups are different in their path coefficients. 
11 
12 --------------------------------- 
13 Insert table 4 about here 
14 --------------------------------- 
15 
16 
17 
18 We proceeded to assess the differences between the path coefficients of the structural 
19 
20 
models of the two groups using Henseler, Ringle, and Sinkovics (2009) boot-strap-based MGA, 
21 
22 
23 which has been recently established as the most conservative MGA method for PLS-SEM 
24 
25 (Rasoolimanesh et al., 2017; Schlägel & Sarstedt, 2016). The results (refer to Table 5) showed that 
26 
27 
28 Saudi and foreign employees significantly differ on the path from SKH → distrust (H2), as the 
29 
30 coefficient was significantly stronger for foreigners (0.598***) than for Saudis (0.432***). 
31 
32 
However, no significant difference was established in the coefficients for H1, H3, and H4. Thus, 
34 
35 H5 was partially supported by the results. It is interesting to note that although MGA revealed no 
36 
37 
significant differences in Saudi and foreign employees for H1 (SKH → OCB-S), H3 (distrust → 
39 
40 OCB-S), and H4 (SKH → distrust → OCB-S), the path coefficients of these relationships were 
41 
42 stronger for Saudi employees (H1: -0.320***, H3: -0.210**, & H4: -0.091*) than for foreign 
43 
44 
45 employees (H1: -0.214*, H3: -0.193ns, & H4: -0.115ns). 
46 
47 --------------------------------- 
48 
Insert table 5 about here 
49 
--------------------------------- 
51 
52 
53 
54 DISCUSSION 
55 
56 
This study aimed to extend the prior understanding of knowledge hiding by examining the 
58 
59 existence and consequences of SKH in the context of the Middle East, in particular in the KSA. 
59 
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Building on social exchange theory, we first examined the direct and indirect relationships, via 
6 
7 distrust in a supervisor, between SKH and supervisee OCB-S. In the second step, we conducted 
8 
9 
an MGA to examine the difference in these relationships across local (i.e., Saudi) and foreign 
11 
12 subsamples. The PLS-SEM-based results of this study provided full support for the first part and 
13 
14 partial support for the second part. More specifically, in providing support for H1, the results 
15 
16 
17 showed that SKH had a significant and negative association with supervisee OCB-S. The results 
18 
19 for H2 and H3 showed that SKH had a significant and positive association with distrust in one’s 
20 
21 
supervisor, which then had a significant and negative association with supervisee OCB-S. Lastly, 
23 
24 the results for H4 showed that distrust in the supervisor significantly mediated the direct negative 
25 
26 
association between SKH and supervisee OCB-S. 
28 
29 
30 
31 
Theoretical Implications 
32 
33 
34 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the existence and consequences of 
35 
36 knowledge hiding in a supervisor-supervisee relationship (i.e., SKH) in the relatively unexplored 
37 
38 
and complicated work context of the KSA. Prior research on knowledge hiding suggests that the 
40 
41 victims of knowledge hiding react to the perpetrator by engaging in reciprocal knowledge hiding 
42 
43 
(Černe et al., 2014; Connelly & Zweig, 2015; Serenko & Bontis, 2016). In the context of SKH, it 
45 
46 is logical to expect that supervisees react to SKH by reducing their OCB-S. Our finding is 
47 
48 
consistent with the leadership-OCB literature, suggesting that negative and unethical supervisory 
50 
51 treatment, such as abusive supervision, motivates supervisees to reduce their OCB to restore 
52 
53 balance in their negative social exchange with their supervisors (Mackey et al., 2017). 
54 
55 
56 Drawing upon social exchange theory and the norm of reciprocity, this study revealed not 
57 
58 only the significant negative association between SKH and supervisee OCB-S but also how this 
59 
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relationship  is  mediated  by  distrust  in  one’s  supervisor,  which  served  as  the  underlying 
6 
7 motivational mechanism maintaining this relationship. The mediation effect of distrust in one’s 
8 
9 
supervisor between SKH and supervisee OCB-S is also consistent with both the knowledge-hiding 
11 
12 and OCB literatures. For instance, Černe et al. (2014) suggest that an employee’s experience of 
13 
14 knowledge hiding by another employee first engenders a feeling of distrust, which in turn 
15 
16 
17 motivates the victim to engage in reciprocal knowledge hiding from the culprit of the knowledge 
18 
19 hiding. The mediation of distrust between the negative supervisory treatment and OCB relationship 
20 
21 
has also been supported in the leadership-OCB literature. For instance, Wu, Huang, Li, and Liu 
23 
24 (2012) highlight that supervisees’ perception of perceived interactional justice by their benevolent 
25 
26 
supervisor first provokes a feeling of trust in the supervisor, which then motivates supervisees to 
28 
29 increase their OCB, whereas supervisees’ perception of negative supervisory behavior (e.g., strict 
30 
31 
observational monitoring) stimulates a feeling of distrust in the supervisor, which in turn motivates 
32 
33 
34 supervisees to reduce their positive work behavior, i.e., OCB-S (Liao & Chun, 2016). 
35 
36 An MGA of this study highlighted that the consequences of SKH, particularly distrust in 
37 
38 
one’s supervisor, in the complex work context of the KSA were not the same for Saudi nationals 
40 
41 and foreign employees. Foreign workers showed more distrust in the supervisor but smaller 
42 
43 
decreases in their OCB-S, whereas Saudi employees showed less distrust but larger decreases in 
45 
46 their OCB-S. Specifically, the data partially supported H5 regarding the MGA of Saudi and foreign 
47 
48 
employees for the relationships hypothesized in H1 to H4. Significant differences between Saudi 
50 
51 and foreign subsamples was recorded only for H2, in which the significant and positive association 
52 
53 between SKH and distrust in the supervisor was significantly stronger for foreign workers than for 
54 
55 
56 Saudis. This finding is in line with the qualitative study of Yeo and Marquardt (2015) and the 
57 
58 
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descriptive survey of Skok and Tahir (2010), which highlighted that foreign employees perceived 
6 
7 knowledge hiding and distrust in their supervisors more than their Saudi counterparts. 
8 
9 
Furthermore, although the MGA did not show a statistically significant difference for H1, 
11 
12 H3, or H4, the direction and coefficient size for these relationships showed that foreign workers 
13 
14 reduced their OCB-S less than their Saudi counterparts. This is again consistent with the qualitative 
15 
16 
17 findings of Yeo and Marquardt (2015), who highlighted lower or nonexistent job security among 
18 
19 foreign workers resulting from the Saudization program. Accordingly, we argue that, despite SKH 
20 
21 
and the subsequent distrust in supervisor, foreign workers might still be trying to remain in their 
23 
24 supervisors’ good graces by engaging in OCB-S to save their jobs. 
25 
26 
Overall, these findings make valuable contributions to the prior knowledge-hiding 
28 
29 literature. By using a research sample from Saudi Arabia and conducting an MGA of locals 
30 
31 
(Saudis) and foreign workers, this study comprehensively addressed the research calls of Connelly 
32 
33 
34 and Zweig (2015), to examine the (1) knowledge hiding that occurs between supervisor and 
35 
36 supervisee and (2) association between knowledge hiding and OCB. Additionally, employing 
37 
38 
supervisor-supervisee dyadic data, rigorous data analysis in PLS-SEM, and some recently 
40 
41 developed advanced analytical techniques, i.e., HTMT, MICOM, and MGA, represent a 
42 
43 
significant methodological contribution of this paper to the knowledge-hiding literature. 
45 
46 
47 
48 
Practical Implications 
50 
51 The results of this study have useful practical implications for managers in terms of understanding 
52 
53 the existence and consequences of SKH in organizations, particularly organizations in the Middle 
54 
55 
56 East. Specifically, our results remind supervisors that their knowledge hiding may backfire and 
57 
58 increase supervisees’ feelings of distrust, which then decreases supervisees’ OCB-S. Prior OCB 
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4 
research has suggested that a supervisor’s success often depends on the extent to which his/her 
6 
7 supervisees are motivated to exhibit OCB-S. For instance, assisting a (fresh) supervisor in doing 
8 
9 
some  of  his/her  supervisory  duties,  helping  him/her  learn  quickly,  passing  him/her  useful 
11 
12 information that he/she himself/herself may not collect, and providing socio-emotional support to 
13 
14 him/her when he/she is down are some examples of how a supervisee’s OCB-S can be valuable to 
15 
16 
17 his/her supervisor. It is crucial for supervisors to avoid creating any perception of SKH by their 
18 
19 supervisees, as this can result in distrust and reduced OCB-S. 
20 
21 
Furthermore, prior research on the ‘trickle-down’ effect of supervisory behavior (Mawritz, 
23 
24 Mayer, Hoobler, Wayne, & Marinova, 2012; Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 
25 
26 
2009) suggests that supervisees’ perceptions of unethical supervisory behavior, i.e., abusive 
28 
29 supervision, motivate them to exhibit the same unethical behavior towards others. Following these 
30 
31 findings, it can be inferred that supervisees’ perceptions of SKH can stimulate them to exhibit the 
32 
33 
34 same unethical behavior towards the supervisors and the co-workers. Thus, our findings suggest 
35 
36 supervisors be the ethical role models for their supervisees by exhibiting knowledge sharing and 
37 
38 
refraining from knowledge hiding behaviors. To achieve this goal, HR managers should implement 
40 
41 nondiscriminatory HR policies and procedures that facilitate a one-on-one communication channel 
42 
43 
between the supervisor and each supervisee, which could be quite useful in building a positive 
45 
46 image and subsequent trust in supervisors by supervisees, which is an essential condition for the 
47 
48 
knowledge sharing behavior. 
50 
51 This is particularly true in the case of foreign workers working in the Middle East, who 
52 
53 often complain about discriminatory supervisory behavior between Saudi and non-Saudi 
54 
55 
56 employees (Skok & Tahir, 2010; Yeo & Marquardt, 2015). The results of the MGA in our study 
57 
58 also confirm that foreign supervisees reacted to SKH by showing distrust in supervisors more than 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
26 
 
 
5 
10 
22 
27 
44 
49 
4 
their local Saudi counterparts. Thus, we suggest that managers pay attention to this aspect of work 
6 
7 life and implement fair and equitable HR policies for both local (Saudi) and foreign employees. 
8 
9 
According to Metcalfe and Murfin (2012), the KSA relies on a large foreign workforce due to the 
11 
12 lack of a skillful local workforce. The pressure has increased to train this local workforce, as the 
13 
14 country is facing challenges in establishing equal employment opportunities to establish 
15 
16 
17 sustainable industries. 
18 
19 Furthermore, to minimize the existence of SKH, it is essential for top management to pay 
20 
21 
attention to those factors that motivate supervisors to hide knowledge from their supervisees, i.e., 
23 
24 a fear of losing power, losing face, and exploitation (Fang, 2017); a lack of psychological safety; 
25 
26 
and an uncertain work context and policies (Yeo & Marquardt, 2015). This can be achieved by 
28 
29 designing and implementing human resource planning strategies that foster a sense of both 
30 
31 
psychological and actual job security among local and foreign employees. Such policies would 
32 
33 
34 motivate employees to assume collective ownership of the knowledge creation and dissemination 
35 
36 processes in their organizations. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 Limitations and Future Research 
42 
43 
Albeit this study has several strengths – e.g., use of two-source supervisor-supervisee dyadic data, 
45 
46 rigorous and advanced data analysis in PLS-SEM to establish discriminant and convergent validity 
47 
48 
and measurement and structural invariance before examining the MGA – it also has some 
50 
51 limitations. Despite some advantages of PLS-SEM, i.e., a rigorous 3-step procedure to ensure 
52 
53 measurement invariance of the hypothesized measurement and structural regression models across 
54 
55 
56 local and foreign workers, built-in function of HTMT for ensuring discriminant validity, and a 
57 
58 smaller sample size requirement for conducting an MGA, the use of PLS-SEM does have some 
57 
58 
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limitations. For example,  Hair Jr et  al.  (2016)  state that PLS-SEM does  not  provide   standard 
6 
7 goodness-of-fit statistics and the evaluation of model is thus based on its ability to predict the 
8 
9 
endogenous variable. However, they also suggest that the use of PLS-SEM is preferable when 
11 
12 using formative indicators. The results of this study should be interpreted in light of these caveats 
13 
14 in mind. 
15 
16 
17 Moreover, the directionality of hypothesized relationships in our model was consistent with 
18 
19 the theory and prior knowledge-hiding and OCB literatures. Nevertheless, the use of cross- 
20 
21 
sectional data is not an ideal research design. Future research may replicate our model using a 3- 
23 
24 wave research design, i.e., measure SKH in time 1, distrust in the supervisor in time 2, and OCB- 
25 
26 
S in time 3. This time-lagged design would be more accurate in establishing the causal order of 
28 
29 the relationships than the inferences made in this study. 
30 
31 
Given that this study examined the mediation effect of distrust in a supervisor between 
32 
33 
34 SKH and OCB-S, future research might explore other mediating mechanisms, i.e., supervisor- 
35 
36 based self-esteem (Landry & Vandenberghe, 2009). For instance, it could be that SKH first hurts 
37 
38 
a supervisee’s supervisor-based self-esteem, e.g., he/she feels not important or valuable to his/her 
40 
41 supervisor, which then motivates him/her to withhold his/her OCB-S, or even some other extra- 
42 
43 
role positive behavior, i.e., promotive and prohibitive voices (Liang, Farh, & Farh, 2012). 
45 
46 Furthermore, it is very likely that some factors, e.g., psychological safety, the availability of 
47 
48 
alternative job opportunities, and a knowledge-sharing climate, moderate the direct and indirect 
50 
51 relationships between SKH and OCB-S. Replicating the relationships examined in this study with 
52 
53 some of these moderators might better explain the reason for the non-significant direct and indirect 
54 
55 
56 effects of SKH on OCB-S for foreign employees. 
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Furthermore, drawing from Mawritz et al. (2012) highlighted ‘trickle-down’ effect of 
6 
7 abusive supervision, an exciting extension of our work would be to collect multilevel data on 
8 
9 
knowledge hiding, i.e., a supervisor’s knowledge hiding from a supervisee and a supervisee’s 
11 
12 knowledge hiding from a coworker, and to examine whether the effect of SKH trickles down to 
13 
14 supervisees’ knowledge hiding from coworkers. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 Conclusion 
20 
21 
This study aimed to answer three important research questions in the knowledge hiding literature, 
23 
24 such as how SKH affects supervisee OCB-S, why it affects supervisee OCB-S, and for which 
25 
26 
employees (i.e., local versus foreign) it affects supervisee OCB-S more. The findings show that 
28 
29 SKH was negatively related to employee OCB-S, and this relationship existed partly due to the 
30 
31 
mediation effect of distrust in one’s supervisor, which was first engendered by SKH and led to 
32 
33 
34 decreased OCB-S. Furthermore, SKH is found to engender distrust in one’s supervisor 
35 
36 significantly more for foreign workers than for local workers. The theoretical implications of this 
37 
38 
study highlight the existence of SKH and its potential positive effects on employees’ distrust in 
40 
41 their supervisor – which is significantly larger for foreign workers than for local workers – and the 
42 
43 
subsequent decrease in OCB-S. In terms of managerial implications, these findings provide 
45 
46 recommendations for managers to be an ethical role model for their supervisees by exhibiting 
47 
48 
knowledge-sharing behavior rather than knowledge-hiding behavior, as the latter ultimately 
50 
51 negatively affects them through employee increased distrust and decreased OCB-S. 
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FIGURE 1 
6 The Hypothesized Measurement and Structural Models 
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6 Descriptive Statistics & Intercorrelations 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
N = 317 (Saudi = 183; Foreign 134); EH = Evasive hiding; PD = Playing dumb; RH = Rationalized hiding; OCB-S 
15 
= Organizational citizenship behavior directed at supervisor; * = < .05; ** = < .01; the diagonal (bold Italic) values 
16 
represent average variance extracted (AVE) 
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26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
Constructs Mean STD EH PD RH Distrust OCB-S 
EH 2.235 1.224 0.847     
PD 2.281 1.278 0.746** 0.839    
RH 3.246 1.516 0.389** 0.453** 0.843   
Distrust 2.617 1.260 0.465** 0.527** 0.240** 0.806  
OCB-S 5.057 1.174 -0.227** -0.248** -0.134* -0.259** 0.682 
 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
41 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 TABLE 2 
 
 
16 
6 Discriminant Validity (HTMT0.85) 
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14 
EH = Evasive hiding; PD = Playing dumb; RH = Rationalized hiding; OCB-S = Organizational citizenship behavior 
15 
directed at supervisor 
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32 
33 
34 
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36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
Constructs EH PD RH Distrust OCB-S 
EH      
PD 0.797     
RH 0.416 0.485    
Distrust 0.495 0.561 0.256   
OCB-S 0.246 0.268 0.146 0.279  
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6 The Hypothesized Structural Model 
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8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
N = 317; * = < .05; ** = < .01; *** = < .001; BC-CIs = Bias-Corrected Confidence Intervals. 
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31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
Hypotheses Coefficients T-value BC-CIs Supported 
H1: SKH → OCB-S    Yes 
Total effect -0.225*** 4.188 -0.374 & -0.138  
Direct effect -0.162* 2.313 -0.295 & -0.017  
H2: SKH → Distrust 0.512*** 11.025 0.418 & 0.595 Yes 
H3: Distrust → OCB-S -0.181** 2.921 -0.297 & -0.046 Yes 
H4: SKH → Distrust → OCB-S -0.093** 2.743 -0.161 & -0.025 Yes 
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6 Measurement Invariance of the Hypothesized Model (5000 Permutations) 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
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18 
19 
20 c = Original composite score correlation; cu = Perm CIs = Confidence intervals; MD = Mean difference; VD = 
21 Variance difference; Step 1 = Configural invariance (Same algorithms for both groups); Step 2 = Compositional 
22 invariance (Correlation = 1); Result 1 = Partial measurement invariance established; Result 2 = Full measurement 
23 invariance established 
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28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
Constructs Step 1 Step 2 5% quantile 
of cu 
Result 1 Step 3 Result 2 
c MD CIs VD CIs 
EH Yes 1.000 1.000 Yes -0.262 -0.223 
0.223 
-0.331 -0.393 
0.427 
No 
PD Yes 1.000 1.000 Yes -0.324 -0.221 
0.228 
-0.341 -0.379 
0.400 
No 
RH Yes 1.000 1.000 Yes 0.017 -0.215 
0.223 (ns) 
0.096 -0.218 
0.231 
Yes 
Distrust Yes 1.000 0.999 Yes -0.293 -0.231 
0.220 
0.011 -0.293 
0.305 
No 
OCB-S Yes 0.996 0.999 Yes -0.165 -0.222 
0.225 
-0.039 -0.309 
0.326 
Yes 
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6 MGA of the Hypothesized Model (Saudi versus Foreign) 
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20 
21 
22 H-p = Hensler’s MGA p value; BC-CIs = Bias-Corrected Confidence Intervals; Diff = Difference; 
23 ns = Nonsignificant. 
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38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
Hypotheses Foreign (134) Saudi (184) Diff H-p Supported 
Coefficients BC- 
CIs 
Coefficients BC- 
CIs 
H1: SKH → OCB-S        
Total effect -0.214* -0.358 -0.320*** -0.470 0.105 0.816 No 
  -0.011  -0.142    
Direct effect -0.099 (ns) -0.306 -0.229** -0.392 0.130 0.808 No 
  0.172  -0.043    
H2: SKH→Distrust 0.598*** 0.466 
0.700 
0.432*** 0.279 
0.558 
0.167 0.967 Yes 
H3: Distrust→OCB-S -0.193 (ns) -0.362 
0.041 
-0.210** -0.363 
-0.044 
0.017 0.549 No 
H4: SKH→Distrust→OCB-S -0.115 (ns) -0.232 
0.022 
-0.091* -0.180 
-0.021 
0.025 0.366 No 
 
